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Abstract 
Social simulation inherently involves social actors, at various levels, that make a wide range of decisions.  However, the decision 
mechanisms used by most research programs have often been intuitive, ad hoc and/or overly simplistic.  In contrast, in all 
cultures and times, diverse social actors are required to make decisions in complex circumstances.  For simulative decision 
mechanisms to be credible, the complex nature of social processes needs to be recognized and represented.  In order to create a 
more credible architecture for social simulation, the present paper introduces a rich, expressive decision process based upon a 
composite mechanism:  polar hermeneutics. 
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1. Prototype Concepts and Polar Hermeneutics 
Social actors continually confront complex fluidities and must achieve a flexible means of integrating multiple 
factors, and a level of coherence that is prerequisite to an effective decision (or flow of decisions).  This focus must 
address various types of actors and multiple levels of detail, each of which contributes to an overall complexity of 
the conceptual process.  In particular, it must conjoin diverse factors that are under consideration into an integrated 
framework. 
1.1. Prototype Reasoning 
Recognition that concepts have a radial (core-periphery) structure, as well as the role that such conceptual 
prototypes play in human reasoning, is a vital innovation within cognitive science in the last half of the 20th century 
[1,2].  However, the larger implication of this insight has yet to be fully realized.  The concept of a cognitive 
prototype was generated largely from empirical research,2 so one way of describing the unrealized potential, is that 
the utilization of prototype concepts within active, dynamic reasoning processes has yet to be adequately explored.   
 
1 Corresponding author. Tel.: 773-702-0601; fax: 773-834-3700.  E-mail address: sallach@uchicago.edu. 
2 However, for a more theoretical contribution, see Wittgenstein’s [3] discussion of concepts manifesting family resemblances. 
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Such an omission seems natural, since research that would identify reasoning processes in depth is more difficult to 
design than studies that document prototypes as a form of passive cognitive data. 
An important step in laying the groundwork for the construction of a prototype reasoning mechanism is to 
recognize how prototype reasoning shapes bounded rationality, another great insight of the same period [4].  Radial 
structures provide a way of organizing and controlling the complexity of the empirical world.  Conceptual 
prototypes group similar phenomena together, with the most pervasive being central in the reasoning process, and 
divergent cases being laid out on a periphery defined by higher dimensions of difference.  The resulting structure is 
far more flexible and powerful than earlier competitors such as Aristotle’s necessary and sufficient conditions, 
and/or formal set theory, with its discrete, unambiguous definitions. 
Often, when the core of a radial structure is well defined, it forms a pole that serves as a standard by which 
instances can be assessed. In some cases, two poles are substantively coupled in ways that allow the resulting duality 
to define a cogent, albeit nonlinear, dimension.  This type of core-periphery structure is particularly useful in social 
science analysis.   
Two hypothetical illustrations of this pattern are shown below.   Figure 1(a) shows two complementary poles of 
an empirical pattern.  As the instances approach either pole, their diversity is reduced and they become more similar 
to each other.  In contrast, as they become more remote from the poles, they become more variegated and, 
accordingly, more complex to conceptualize.  In many empirical examples, the growing complexity will be 
multidimensional. 
Figure 1(b) shows approximately the same (hypothetical) empirical pattern as 1(a), except that the poles are ideal 
types [5,6].  The latter is an idealized pattern in which the analyst does not expect any empirical cases to fully 
conform to the type (represented in Figure 1(b) by the empty circles at each pole).  Rather, the empirical cases 
approach the ideal type in dense clusters, while those that deviate from the ideal type (toward the periphery) are 
more diverse.  Thus, a pattern is reminiscent of Tolstoy’s aphorism about families:  “All happy families resemble 
one another; each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way” [7]. 
1.2. Multi-scale Bounded Rationality 
Originating in the area of textual interpretation [8], for most of its history hermeneutics has been a qualitative 
form of analysis for managing cognitive and empirical complexity. Its basic principle is to use lower levels to 
interpret higher levels and, in turn, higher to interpret lower levels.  From words to sentences, to paragraphs, to 
pages, to chapters, to books, to oeuvres; from lower to higher and higher to lower, without any privileged starting 
point. This was frequently described as a ‘hermeneutic circle’ in which the analysis moves up or down the text until 
the interpretation stabilizes. 
 
 
Fig. 1. (a) empirical polarities; (b) idealized polarities 
In the 19th and early 20th centuries, hermeneutics began to be used in the area of historical interpretation.  The 
present strategy is to build on this precedent, supporting hermeneutic socio-historical interpretation for all 
endogenous actors.  Thus, there are three types of innovation:  1) support hermeneutic interpretation within a model, 
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2) apply hermeneutics to social as well as historical interpretation, and 3) support it for social actors at multiple 
levels.  Recognition of prototype concepts in human conceptualization undergirds how hermeneutic interpretation 
has been used in decision-making.  If the patterns and elements are familiar and their implications well known, 
decisions can be made more quickly and more confidently.  Novel or rare actors and/or circumstances require more 
cautious assessment. 
Polar hermeneutics defines a form of bounded rationality (one of the key concepts being modeled), however, a 
social extension is necessary.  Bounded rationality is usually applied to individual cognition, but many social agents 
are collective in form (i.e., nations, parties, organizations, movements, factions, etc.), that have diverse structures, 
exist at different levels, and interact across levels.  While these factors add considerable complexity to the ultimate 
model, the information that can be taken into account and processed is, nonetheless, bounded for collective agents as 
well, even though the form such boundings take will vary. 
In the same way that historians balance general structures and situated action, socio-historical actors making a 
flow of decisions must be able to similarly achieve orientational equilibria, however evanescent it may be.  
Hermeneutics provides one of the more flexible techniques that textual and historical analysts have used for 
centuries in arriving at a coherent interpretation.  Properly designed, a hermeneutic mechanism provides an excellent 
candidate for modeling social agents capable of addressing complexities of diverse types across multiple levels. 
A core structure of such a mechanism can be a configuration of polarities designed to be dynamically responsive 
to changes in the social environment.  Not only is such a mechanism flexible, it is also mathematically grounded.3  
The benefits of this structure can be demonstrated by considering a set of possible polarities, then turning to the 
question of how a social actor might use them to achieve coherent decisions. 
1.3. Polarities and dualities 
Dualities that draw upon domain-specific considerations provide a way to characterize a framework for actor 
interpretation.  Because of bounded rationality, social actors cannot address an unlimited number of dualities as 
dimensions.  The present model design supports a Miller [11] range of dualities and their hermeneutic interaction.  
An illustrative set of dualities is presented in the discussion to follow. 
The dualities summarized below define poles that are not strictly discrete.  As indicated above, less extreme 
locations lie between the defined poles in a radial pattern, whether empirical or idealized (cf., Figure 1).  Consider 
such polarities as interpretive spaces relative to which each actor reasons.  Figure 2(a) presents a pragmatic 
illustration of how two polarities can be integrated into a single mechanism. 
1.3.1. Compare/prepare  
Strategic social actors must assess the relative strength of allies and adversaries, the types of objectives that are 
feasible, and the types of preparations that make particular strategies realistic.  In Figure 2(a), this is represented by 
the Compare/Prepare duality.  The actor compares the present state with a desired state and, based on that 
assessment, prepares a course of action that can achieve the desired state, or at least move toward it. 
1.3.1.1. Example:  Movement Mobilization 
By design, a recent model of movements in Tajikistan [12] supports four types of mobilization.  An individual or 
group:  1) is identified as part of a mobilization potential, 2) is selected a target of mobilization efforts, 3) becomes 
motivated to participate in the movement, and 4) has barriers to movement participation removed.  However, the 
assessment of a movement, relative to other mobilizing possibilities, remains implicit.  By linking comparison and 
preparation, the decision mechanism will more accurately reflect the way that interacting movements stimulate and 
compete with each other. 
1.3.2. Frame/Claim 
Relations of conflict and contention are defined in terms of frame definition [13,14] and claim-making, whether 
 
3 In the mid-twentieth century, adjunction was discovered to provide a powerful mathematical formalism [9,10].  Inter alia, it was determined 
that functors frequently arise in pairs.  This has led to methodological efforts to identify second, complementary functors. 
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international [15] or domestic [16].  The existence of competing frames and claims makes coherence in this area a 
continual accomplishment.  Frames provide a broad basis for interpretation and, yet, may be motivated by 
unresolved claims.  The existence of competing frames and claims makes coherence in this area a continual 
accomplishment.  At the same time, claims are dependent upon the larger frame (and which actors endorse it) for 
legitimacy.  Thus, it is evident that frames and claims also mutually shape each other. 
1.4. Polar Dynamics 
Within each duality, hermeneutic interaction between the poles informs and shapes both.  But hermeneutic 
interaction also takes place between the dual dimensions as well.  Claims, both resolved and unresolved, influence 
the assessment of comparative states.  Frames are deployed as a preparation for action.  In this way, and in greater 
depth than described here, polar hermeneutics provides a rich framework for simulating the path from interpretation 
to action. 
A second pair of dualities shown in Figure 2(b) illustrates that polar hermeneutics can be abstract, as well as 
pragmatic.  In this context, abstraction means that, in any historical or policy-specific setting, the forms of power 
and dependence, on the one hand, and constraints and affordances, on the other, will need to be defined in greater 
detail in terms of the nature of the relations among the actors, and the resources that are brought to bear by those 
relations.  Before considering in greater detail how abstract dualities are embellished and instantiated by concrete 
resources, let us first consider the dualities depicted in Figure 2(b). 
1.4.1. Power/Dependence 
Since the mechanism is designed to support models of strategy, conflict and contention, power/dependence 
relations play an important role in defining relative actor strengths [17].  Power and dependence are defined in terms 
of each other, and are thus thoroughly dual.  However, the relationship can take very different forms based upon the 
historical setting, strategic requirements and the scale of the actors. 
 
                                
Fig. 2. (a) pragmatic polar hermeneutics; (b) abstract polar hermeneutics 
Moreover, because they are relational, strengths can undergo inversions.  Thus, employers were long assumed to 
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hold power over dependent employees, however, labor organizing caused a shift in the power/dependence relations 
between the two types of social actors.  Here, too, such relations can be represented in varying degrees of detail. 
1.4.1.1. Example:  Mutual Support among Institutions 
It is common for one national institution to have power over another in one area, while also being dependent 
upon them in another.  As an example, in Saudi Arabia, since the time of Ibn Saud, Salafi religious institutions and 
the Saud ruling family have had a mutual power/dependence relationship.  Saudi officials have protected and 
subsidized the Salafi mosques and schools, including the madrassas established abroad, while Salafi scholars and 
leaders have (for the most part) accepted and defended the legitimacy of the Saudi regime.  The forms of support 
have been complementary, and the withdrawal of either would destabilize the arrangement. 
1.4.1.2. Example:  Reciprocal Support between Nations 
Subsequent to World War II, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia established a reciprocal relationship by providing 
security and market access to oil.  This includes the sale of advanced weaponry and the suppression of oil prices in a 
crisis, respectively. 
Such assessments often create chains of means/ends activities, including asset acquisition, mobilization and 
logistics.  Comparisons provide a focus for preparation, while effective preparations modify ensuing assessments.   
1.4.2. Confordance4 Dynamics 
From the physical to the ideational, the interaction of constraints [18,19,20] and affordances [21,22] is on the 
cusp of strategic action.  Like other dualities, the two are thoroughly interwoven.  Constraints block affordances, and 
overcoming a constraint constitutes an affordance.  An unexpected affordance may obviate an existing constraint, 
while an existing affordance may be removed by the creation of a new constraint.   
Such confordance dynamics are thereby deeply involved in all forms of strategic interaction.  For some purposes, 
constraints and affordances may be considered a type of power/dependence.  Such interactions lay the groundwork 
for higher hermeneutics. 
1.5. Complex Polarities  
Additional dimensional dualities are possible.  Two examples are summarized here that, when refined, have the 
potential to play a critical organizing role in many prospective applications. 
1.5.1. Problems/Solution  
This duality will be a frequent starting point for decision hermeneutics.  Beginning with a problem/solution 
duality indicates that a decision process is pragmatic.  (Other starting points might be more analytical.)  An 
emerging focus of action is defined by the gap between the problem and solution definitions (which, themselves, 
may evolve during the course of the simulation).  When the gap is sufficiently minimized, a stopping criterion 
defined by the implementation will be reached. 
The problem and solution poles can be defined in terms of states or processes.  Coherence criteria can assess the 
progress from problem to solution. 
1.5.2. Affect/Effect  
Ultimately, interpretation of such polarities (in concrete forms) results in actions that give rise to consequences.  
Due to the broad skein of interactions, the resulting effects are often not what are intended.  These results feed into 
the hermeneutic process and are, thus, subject to further interpretation. 
2. Hermeneutics as a Decision Mechanism 
 
4 ‘Confordance’ is a neologism that integrates constraint and affordance.  It was introduced [23] because constraints and affordances act relative 
to each other.  For example, a constraint may preclude an otherwise available affordance; an affordance may take the form of mitigating or 
evading one or more constraints; and adversarial activity involves the manipulation of the constraints and affordances of the other.  Thus, 
considered tactically and strategically, constraints and affordances form an integrated and interactive process. 
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Notwithstanding the prevalence and advantages of hermeneutic reasoning, it must still be translated into a 
computational mechanism, and this is not a trivial task.  The present section explores some of the relevant issues. 
2.1. Hermeneutic Sequencing 
The dualities described thus far have been presented one pair at a time as a means of introducing complexities 
gradually.  These polarities are just a starting point, but they do cover a range of reasonably sophisticated 
considerations.  In a working system, it is likely that all four would be combined into a single hermeneutic process.  
A simple hermeneutic implementation might loop through them in a sequential order, and then loop back to the start, 
thus forming a circular hermeneutic process.   
The hermeneutic of each duality assesses the balance between those two poles.  However, it is also a hermeneutic 
process that assesses the coherence of the set of polarities as a whole.  For example, an abstract hermeneutical 
sequence might move from the least coherent polarity to the most, improving the coherence of each, as feasible.  
Such an ordering would provide an alternative to the simple loop. 
A more complex high-level sequence could regard each of the downstream polarities as a resource available to 
achieving problem/solution coherence, and access them in the order of their potential contribution.  However, such 
an order would presume a reasonably sophisticated assessment strategy.  This topic will be addressed in the next 
section. 
Whichever order is implemented (or selected), each of the polarities serves to organize radially-organized 
empirical patterns, that may be nested to arbitrary levels of depth, depending on the nature of the specific model.  
Such nesting suggests that the hermeneutic of polarity types that has been the primary focus of the present 
discussion, will be extended by an orthogonal depth-oriented structure.  This additional dimension suggests that 
among the available algorithms will also be a recurrent design choice of depth-first versus breadth-first sequencing. 
2.2. Computational Hermeneutics 
Two principles of hermeneutic interpretation are procedurally important.  First, there is no defined starting or 
stopping point.  Reasoning or planning can begin in the most concrete detail or the most abstract principle, or 
anywhere in between [8].  Nor is there any scale-specific sequence.  Rather, emergent meaning is deeply embedded 
in context.  There is an ongoing search for coherence among types of elements and at diverse scales.  Partial 
construal evokes deeper comprehension.  The process is like using pieces of a puzzle to determine the overall 
pattern and what elements are missing, or need to be achieved. 
Second, hermeneutic decision-making is deeply situated, and often opportunistic.  The social location, 
commitments and interests of the actor determine the forms of coherence that are pursued.  This is why simple 
algorithms, including random sequencing, are ineffective at modeling decision processes that are subtle or relatively 
complex. 
2.3. Satisficiency and Coherence 
In the model defined here, the interpretive process will be driven by coherence.  Consistent with Rescher’s 
recommendation [24], coherence is used as the criterion for when closure is achieved.  However, while Rescher 
recommends coherence as a truth criterion, the present mechanism follows Thagard [18] in invoking coherence 
more broadly, to emotion, representation and inference.  Various social actors may integrate and/or weight these 
factors differently, and we want the mechanism to be able to express this. 
Since the hermeneutic mechanism is designed to allow social actors to address socio-historical complexities, the 
criteria need to reflect that priority.  Coherence is not an optimizing, but a satisficing criterion.  This provides 
flexibility, including the possibility that actors with comparable priorities and assets may nonetheless select different 
strategies. 
Of course, actors must assess what is or is not coherent, albeit in various ways.  Fortunately, there is some 
consensus among prior research programs as to how decision-making coherence can be assessed.  Both Thagard 
[18] and Douven & Meijs [25], for example, propose that coherence can be effectively assessed using constraint 
satisfaction or, as formulated here, confordance dynamics.  More specifically, Thagard defines coherence in terms of 
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pair-wise constraints.  The coherence of two elements creates a positive constraint that is satisfied by the acceptance 
or rejection of both elements.  The incoherence of two elements creates a negative constraint that is satisfied by the 
acceptance of one element and the rejection of the other.  A more formal summary of the model is presented in the 
bullets listed below: 
 
• Let E be a finite set of elements {ei} and C be a set of constraints on E where each ci is associated with 
set {(ei,ej)} of pairs of elements of E 
• C may be divided into C+, the positive constraints on E, and C-, the negative constraints on E 
• Each constraint is associated with a number wi, which is the weight (strength) of the constraint 
• The problem is to partition E into two sets, A (accepted) and R (rejected), subject to two coherence 
conditions: 
o If (ei, ej) is in C+, then ei is in A iff ej is in A 
o If (ei, ej) is in C-, then ei is in A iff ej is in R 
• Let W be the sum of the weights wi of the satisfied constraints 
• The coherence problem is to partition E into A and R in a way that maximizes W 
• Coherence is maximized if there is no other partition that has greater total weight 
 
Jeavons and his colleagues [26] document how relational database techniques can be used to represent constraint 
satisfaction techniques.  This is significant not only because the relational model has a solid mathematical 
foundation, but also because it allows constraint problems to be parameterized using available database resources.  
Subsequent work has identified common formalisms for both relational models and constraint satisfaction problems 
using hypergraphs and universal algebra [27] and category theory [19].  The latter provides the potential for 
integrating the social and computational aspects of the mechanism into a common formalism. 
There remains the issue of how to specifically measure diverse types of coherence.  Beyond Thagard, Douven 
and Meijs compare and contrast a range of specific constructs, and the strategies that they make available.  This 
analysis provides the basis for the coherence mechanism and its calibration. 
2.4. Dimensional Dynamics 
One aspect of the relationship between prototype theory and bounded rationality is suggested by Miller’s magic 
number seven (plus or minus two) [11], which suggests the scale of relevant components of a prototype concept.  If 
the senses of a concept become too many or too few, it is necessary to broaden or narrow the focus while retaining 
the constraints of cognitive limitations.  Of course, multiple prototype concepts are combined in various ways, a 
process which must also respect the bounded limits of effective rationality.   
There is no general consensus as regarding how and where the ‘magic number’ applies, however, even an 
approximate scale factor is useful in mechanism design.  In the current implementation of polar hermeneutics, the 
Miller number is used in two ways.  First, following Miller, the standard number of bipolar dimensions is within the 
‘magic’ range.  Diverse social agents may have different capacities, which serves as one proxy for intelligence 
and/or analytical capability.  Second, nine is the upper bound of bipolar dimensions available to any actor, even 
large scale actors.  This constraint is mitigated in two ways:  1) additional referents can be derived by their relative 
location within strategy space, and 2) bipolar dimensions can be swapped in (and, thus, out) on an as-needed basis. 
 
3. Conclusion 
The polar hermeneutics mechanism is currently under development as part of a decision support tool called the 
Virtual Multiscale Strategist.  The architecture for controlling coherence synthesizes the most advanced concepts 
summarized in Section 2.3.  Many of the choices and parameterization options described in Section 2 are being 
made available to the analyst as a means of shaping customized groups of social actors. 
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